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ABSTRACT 
This paper addresses the issue of what happens when humanitarian response is absent, to see how ‘self-help’ 
recovery can inform development assistance paradigms and practice. We explore livelihoods strategies and 
community-led recovery processes during conflict in Somaliland, as an example of a region witnessing an 
acutely disruptive conflict and an absence of humanitarian aid, to evaluate the economic recovery that emerged. 
The conflict is tracked through perceptions of those who lived through the disaster, their acute recollections of 
the bombing of Hargeisa in 1988 that flattened the city, the declaration of a semi-autonomous nation in 1991, 
and its subsequent development over the last 25 years. This critical case study aims to inform the humanitarian 
assistance agenda in relation to livelihoods as self-help process in post-conflict recovery. 
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Informal economies, conflict recovery and absent aid   
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper addresses the issue of what happens in the aftermath of conflict when humanitarian response is 
absent, to see how ‘self-help’ recovery can inform development assistance paradigms and practice. We explore 
livelihoods strategies and community-led recovery processes in the context of conflict in Somaliland, a region 
that experienced an acutely disruptive conflict and an absence of humanitarian aid, to evaluate the economic 
recovery that emerged. The conflict is tracked through perceptions and recollections of those who lived through 
the disaster: the bombing of Hargeisa in 1988 that flattened the city, the declaration of a semi-autonomous 
nation in 1991, and its subsequent development over the last 25 years. This critical case study aims to inform 
the humanitarian assistance agenda in relation to livelihoods as self-help process in post-conflict recovery. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
“In the 1988 bombing, Hargeisa was eighty percent demolished. The diaspora helped start the 
rebuilding and within 8 months things were getting in shape – it was so fast. In Ethiopia there were 
refugees, and they established businesses in the camps. There was not a single beggar – although 
they left the cities empty-handed, people shared”. (KI, Former politician) 
 
The Somali civil war of the 1980s was brutal and protracted. During the conflict, the Somali National 
Movement (SNM) waged a guerrilla war in the northwest of Somalia (now Somaliland) against the oppressive 
military regime of General Siad Barre. The civil war led to widespread death and destruction throughout 
Somalia. Following the collapse of the Barre regime in January 1991, local elders and SNM forces declared 
unilateral independence from Somalia on 18 May 1991 establishing Somaliland as an autonomous entity. Much 
has been written about Somaliland’s traditional peace process, through which the break-away nation emerged 
from civil war in the late 1980s. After the collapse of Barre’s regime, the rebel SNM controlled most of 
northern Somalia and concentrated on ceasefire agreements with clans on opposing sides. Peace was negotiated 
over two years, through three peace conferences and many smaller gatherings, each led by clan elders and 
lasting for weeks or months. Humanitarian agencies were severely restricted in their operations during the 
height of civil war, but by 1990 a UN mission and several international NGOs had returned to address mass 
starvation and famine in the south. They remained largely absent in the north.  
 
Equally remarkable, but much less well documented is the economic recovery in Somaliland, particularly the 
role of indigenous enterprise in rebuilding the modern state. Somaliland has never been internationally 
recognised and so was never eligible for foreign assistance. It is thus argued that state formation and 
accountability was deeply entwined with the building of a viable tax base1 2. In parallel, bolstered by light 
regulation and lack of corruption, a flourishing private sector contributed to economic stabilisation. Both 
diaspora investment3 and indigenous enterprise contributed to the recovery, but this paper concentrates on the 
latter to explore how informal and small-scale enterprises4 contributed to the economic resilience of the 
                                                     
1
 Eubank, N. (2012) Taxation, political accountability and foreign aid: lessons from Somaliland, Journal of 
Development Studies, 48(4): 465-480. 
2
 The 2014 Somaliland Special Arrangement now sets out modalities through which development finance can be 
channelled 
3
 Migration is a key feature of Somali society, with many Somali born people living outside the country, some of whom 
fled due to the civil war. This diverse diaspora community is found in neighbouring countries, the Gulf States, and in 
western countries, and most contribute to the economic development of Somaliland through remittances. 
4
 Although there is no universally accepted definition of the informal economy, this paper uses the framework adopted 
by the ILO (2013) which takes the informal economy to include: the informal sector defined as small unincorporated, 
unregistered enterprises; and informal employment which takes place without social protection, and includes own-
account workers, contributing family workers, and employees holding informal jobs. 
3 
secessionist state in the absence of humanitarian aid. Just as Turner’s work on self-help housing in Peru in the 
1960s and 1970s created awareness of self-help approaches in the housing development sector, this paper seeks 
to learn from self-help informal enterprises in the aftermath of conflict to inform humanitarian support for 
urban livelihoods in this context. 
 
The paper draws on a qualitative study of the recollections of those involved in the conflict, particularly the 
bombing of 1988, etched sharply in the minds of those who lived through it, although this was just one event 
in a much longer civil war. The study in Hargeisa was part of comparative research on urban livelihoods in 
four post-conflict cities. It included interviews with 186 informal economy workers, including 47 who had 
experienced the conflict in 1988, discussions through a 3-day conflict-mapping workshop held with 25 
vulnerable workers, in-depth key informant interviews with 20 elders, government staff, local NGOs and 
international agencies, and three focus groups with women, a youth NGO, and informal economy workers. 
 
The paper has seven sections. After this introduction, section two briefly discusses the role of livelihoods in 
humanitarian aid discourse, and section three offers a detailed exploration of core themes emerging from the 
literature on livelihoods in conflict affected settings. Section four introduces the case study, and section five 
discusses the analysis of the community-led recovery process from a livelihoods lens. Section six reviews the 
emerging economy of modern Somaliland since the conflict, and section seven is the conclusion. 
 
II. HUMANITARIAN AID AND LIVELIHOODS 
 
The distinction between humanitarian and development domains is becoming increasingly blurred, but studies 
repeatedly conclude that livelihoods interventions are too often delayed in the context of conflict, and are seen 
as a responsibility for development actors rather than humanitarian assistance programmes. Key development 
actors stress the significance of livelihoods programming. UNDP’s guide on Livelihoods and Economic 
Recovery in Crisis Situations,5 for example, adopts a three-track approach including livelihoods stabilization 
(Track A), local economic recovery for medium-to long-term employment (Track B), and long-term 
employment creation (Track C). Similarly, a joint ILO-World Bank6 study of demand-driven approaches to 
livelihood support in post-war contexts sets out eight operational principles, which include early short-term 
actions involving small-scale livelihood activities alongside longer-term planning for national economic 
recovery. Despite the clear recognition amongst development actors of the importance of early livelihood 
interventions, the humanitarian sector has less effectively grappled with this agenda.  
 
There is broad consensus that, at least until the last decade, humanitarian interventions played a limited role in 
providing livelihoods support7. In a telling quotation from a study in the DRC, an aid worker stated; ‘we don’t 
have the time or the need for all that. For our sector, all that is relevant is to know whether people have water 
or not.’8 However, attitudes have shifted in the past decade, and livelihoods are now a more common part of 
the discourse amongst aid agencies9. For example, in 2006 the International Federation of Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies (IFRC) appointed livelihood aid officers among its senior staff for the first time10 and 
livelihoods feature prominently in both the IFRC’s 2008 guidelines for assessment in emergencies and the 
2011 Cash Transfer Guidelines. More broadly, at the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016 more than 3,500 
                                                     
5
 United Nations Development Programme (2013a) Livelihoods and Economic Recovery in Crisis Situations, New York: 
UNDP. 
6
 Goovaerts, P., Gasser, M. and Inbal, A.B. (2005) Demand Driven Approaches to Livelihood Support in Post-War 
Contexts, Washington: World Bank. 
7
 Bhatia, M. and Goodhand, J. with Atmar, H., Pain, A. and Suleman, M. (2003) Profits and poverty: aid: livelihoods 
and conflict in Afghanistan in Collinson, S. (Ed) Power, Livelihoods and Conflict: Case studies in Political Economy 
Analysis for Humanitarian Action, London: ODI. 
Jackson, S. (2003) Fortunes of war: the coltan trade in the Kivus in Collinson, S. (Ed) Power, Livelihoods and Conflict: 
Case studies in Political Economy Analysis for Humanitarian Action, London: ODI. 
8
 DRC = Democratic Republic of Congo. See reference 7, Jackson (2003), p. 35. 
9
 Régnier, P., Neri, B., Scuteri, S. and Miniati, S. (2008) From emergency relief to livelihood recovery: lessons learned 
from post-tsunami experiences in Indonesia and India, Disaster Prevention and Management: An International Journal, 
17(3): 410-430. 
10
 See reference 9, Régnier et al. (2008). 
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individual commitments were made by the humanitarian sector, but only 42 of these related to livelihoods and 
a single reference was made to the informal economy11.  
 
Thus the livelihood programmes of humanitarian aid agencies are still in their infancy12 and four primary 
challenges appear to face the sector in relation to this developing agenda. First, existing livelihood programmes 
predominantly focus on rural contexts, giving limited attention to urban programming13. Second, some 
humanitarian organisations lack expertise and knowledge about urban livelihood interventions14, in part due 
to the limited research on livelihoods in conflict-affected cities. Some argue that this lack of know-how also 
extends to most development institutions15. Third, some scholars have found that livelihood interventions 
which are ignorant of local social, political and economic contexts may have a detrimental impact on the local 
economy, or reproduce the conflicting social relations that underpinned the initial conflict,16 or perhaps in 
urban areas support war economies such as arms or drug trade, thus contravening the ‘do no harm’ principle 
of humanitarian aid. For example, in a study of livelihoods in Afghanistan, Bhatia and Goodhand17 described 
how NGO support for carpet producers helped meet initial socio-economic needs but risked reinforcing an 
exploitative relationship with dealers in Pakistan. Fourth, the challenge is to support the livelihood 
opportunities created by conflict – to ‘build back better’– as conflict may create a window of opportunity to 
improve on pre-conflict livelihood conditions, although there is little evidence to date of interventions 
achieving such a goal18. 
 
III. LIVELIHOOD TRANSFORMATIONS IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED SETTINGS  
 
 
 
One of the core challenges is that little research has been undertaken into urban livelihoods in post-conflict 
settings, particularly in the transition from aid to recovery. The lack of research in this area is surprising given 
that in conflict-affected situations there is often a rapid growth in the urban informal economy, as economic 
turmoil leads to high inflation, loss of formal work and civil unrest, and the vulnerability of informal workers 
intensifies. Even when the informal economy is acknowledged in post-conflict recovery, it is seen only as part 
of an early transition19, or as second-best to formal sector work20. Overall these perspectives fail to engage 
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with the increasing body of work undertaken by urban scholars that claims a legitimate and continuing role for 
the urban informal economy in development21. This section thus draws together work that has been done on 
urban livelihoods in conflict,  identifying the key themes that form the broad framework for our discussion of 
empirical material. 
 
In conflict-affected settings, urban households often engage with informal markets in order to sustain their 
livelihoods22. Pantuliano et al.’s study in Sudanese cities, Aysa-Lastra’s in Bogata, and Iyenda’s in Kinshasa23, 
all cite access to petty trade and daily labour as the first survival tactic of urban workers in post-conflict 
situations. In Iraq, Looney24 found that the informal economy was the only realm to survive the post-2003 
period of instability. Survival economies are not always risk-free – in Somalia many women turned to rubbish-
collection and/or prostitution25.  
 
Displaced populations face particular challenges in recovering livelihoods, although migration to avoid 
conflict can also be a key livelihood strategy. For example, Seddon and Hussein26 have shown that rural-urban 
migration was common during and after the civil war in Nepal. However, migration is not risk-free and forced 
displacement exposes people to new forms of violence and economic, political and social discrimination. 
Crucially, it also dismantles people’s established capital, networks and opportunities to make use of livelihoods 
expertise27. After the Colombian conflict for instance, Ibáñez and Moya28 noted that employment rates dropped 
from 98% to less than 2% three months after people had migrated to urban areas.  
 
Social solidarity is vital and is often used by the displaced to secure access to housing and employment29. Food 
and basic services are often shared during crises. However, solidarity based on ethnicity or heritage can also 
create segregation and contribute to further conflict. Jacobsen30 has documented how, in Mexican cities, 
refugees were obstructed by the host community, which refused them access to resources and freedom of 
settlement. Conversely, migrant economies can destabilise existing informal economies. In Cairo, migrants 
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 Cross, J. and Morales, A. (eds) (2007) Street Entrepreneurs: People, Place and Politics in Local and Global 
Perspectives, Abingdon: Routledge.  
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26
 Seddon, D. and Hussein, K. (2002) The consequences of conflict: livelihoods and development in Nepal, Working 
Paper 185, Livelihoods and Chronic Conflict Series, London: ODI  
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Working Paper 385, Brighton: IDS (Institute of Development Studies). 
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from Upper Egypt displaced established street traders and violently claimed space after the Arab revolution31. 
In Karachi, the strengthening of migrant networks based on family, ethnicity or religion, has heightened 
sectarian violence and urban conflict32. Thus while displacement informal economies can be crucial to 
establishing migrant livelihoods, the impact on longer-term development outcomes can be mixed.  
 
War economies, linked to the sale of fuel or arms, or provision of security services, are linked, according to 
Taylor, to the “informal markets that co-exist with the armed violence of war”, remembering that “while 
economies of violence are sources of power for regime elites” they are also sources of jobs for households33. 
These economies exploit insecurity, lack of regulation and punitive rent-seeking34, and include predatory 
behaviour ranging from armed robbery and vigilantism to business fraud35. Yet within war economies, it is 
important to distinguish between people who participate for profit and power, and those coerced to work36. For 
example, in Nepal many young people joined the Maoists rather than flee, in order to protect their families37. 
Conflict economies may lead to a ‘dark side’ of development, creating businesses that may undermine peaceful 
recovery, such as arms sales. More detailed understandings are needed of socially acceptable activities that 
emerge after conflict, and that can strengthen as economic and political stability returns, such as replacement 
services, transport, or IT-based services. 
 
The informal economy also has a key role to play in employment generation for the young, particularly young 
men and ex-combatants, who, if not employed may participate in continuing violence and petty crime. 
Hoffman38 has researched how social networks of unemployed ex-combatants and other youths, in Monrovia 
and other Liberian cities came together to seek different informal job opportunities. This reintegration of ex-
combatants into socially acceptable, albeit informal, livelihoods is crucial to avoiding the emergence of 
criminal groups that could destabilise the peace process39.  
Women’s roles in conflict and recovery are complex. Women are often victims of violence, for example 
gender-based sexual violence, but they can also contribute to violence as combatants or by inciting relatives 
to fight40. Women disproportionately experience the more challenging effects of displacement and disrupted 
public services, and the adverse impacts of conflict on child-raising. However, conflict can also be 
transformative for women’s economic empowerment, particularly where they have been excluded from urban 
labour markets before. During crises, women’s work often becomes essential, and, according to Beall and 
Schütte, a “critical asset and important means of managing urban livelihoods”41. During conflict, women 
often become heads of households, and the main breadwinners, learning new income-earning skills42. Yet, 
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despite women’s central role during conflict, their needs and rights are generally overlooked in conflict 
resolution processes43.  
The importance of economic growth in diffusing conflict is highlighted in several studies44, although is under-
researched45. Economic growth, it is claimed, can significantly reduce the risk of civil war46. However, studies 
suggest that different informal activities have different potentials for growth. Vaillant et al.47 note the role of 
Madagascar’s informal firms in creating jobs after long periods of political upheaval, and Kremer et al.48 find 
that microenterprises that require low-level start-up capital (most common in conflict-affected areas) can give 
high returns. In contrast, Adam49 and Iyenda50 both query whether petty trade can reduce poverty in post-
conflict settings. 
 
Some studies recognise that the informal economy can play a key role in longer-term recovery. For example, 
displaced communities build social resilience by transferring  knowledge, technology, remittances and other 
livelihood resources to the host communities, which can trigger innovative response mechanisms in the context 
of conflict51. The informal economy can also provide key public services in the absence of the state, for 
example replacing water supplies or providing transport. Ballentine and Nitzschke argue that the“main 
challenge for peacebuilding efforts is to address the dysfunctional elements of the shadow economy … while 
retaining its socially beneficial aspects to civilian dependants”52.  
 
In summary then, several key themes emerge from the discussion of livelihoods in conflict literature, for 
example: the importance of the informal economy as a source of livelihoods and in replacing services during 
highly disruptive conflict; the emergence of social networks and solidarity amongst affected communities; the 
growth and adverse effects of war economies, and impacts on the economic roles of women. These key themes 
provide our framework for examining livelihoods strategies in the informal economy in conflict affected 
Somaliland.  
 
 
IV. SOMALILAND – EMERGING FROM THE ASHES 
 
a. Conflict and the state in Somaliland 
 
Modern Somaliland is an emergent state born out of war. The former British protectorate became briefly 
independent on 26 June 1960, but maintained this independence for only five days before merging with Italian 
Somalia on 1 July 1960 to form the Somali Democratic Republic. From the start the alliance was uneasy. 
Northerners were largely excluded from the southern-dominated parliament. A coup in 1969 brought Siad 
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Barre to power, who used indiscriminate killing and torture as instruments of control53. The 1974-75 drought 
and famine was followed in 1977-78 by the disastrous war with Ethiopia in which the Somali Democratic 
Republic’s invasion of the Ethiopian-Somali region was defeated, resulting in over a million refugees, mainly 
of Somali ethnicity, flooding into Somalia. About half of these refugees came to the north54.  
 
The civil war of the 1980s was brutal and protracted. In 1981, the Somali National Movement (SNM), one of 
several rebel movements, was formed in London by elders and intellectuals, mainly from the Isaaq clan, the 
dominant clan in northwest Somalia. The SNM later waged a guerrilla war from Ethiopia on the northwest of 
the country. Throughout the 1980s, the civil war led to widespread death and destruction. It destroyed transport 
routes and closed Berbera port to animal trade, decimating the pastoral economy which depended on animal 
exports to the Gulf55.  
 
Under orders from Barre to ‘kill all but the crows’, in May and June 1988 four aircraft, two flown by Somali 
pilots, launched a savage bombing raid on Hargeisa, flattening the city56. Around 50,000 people were killed, 
and less than 10% of the buildings survived57. The civil war intensified and up to 200,000 people may be buried 
in the 226 known mass graves58. More than half a million Isaaq fled to Ethiopia, and around half a million 
became internally displaced. Facing insurrection throughout the country, and widespread famine, the Barre 
forces were eventually confined to Mogadishu and in January 1991 Barre fled.  
 
b. Post-conflict political development 
 
From this destruction the extraordinary clan-led peace process emerged, through which the breakaway state of 
Somaliland was formed. Government forces fled or were captured, and as one interviewee in our research said, 
“We gave the soldiers money, and they ran away. We let all the captives go – we didn’t kill anybody”. The 
SNM then made peace agreements between clans, and the first peace conference led by elders was held in 
Berbera in February 1991. On 18 May 1991, at a second conference in Burao, the elders withdrew from the 
union and declared restoration of the Republic of Somaliland59. Fighting continued, with violent clashes in 
Burao and Berbera as different factions vied for power, although peace negotiations continued throughout the 
country.  
 
Elders in Somaliland are selected for their knowledge, piety and fairness, and women played a key role in 
negotiations as dual kinship (with the clan of birth and of marriage) enabled them to mediate between 
factions60. Colonisation had left Somaliland underdeveloped, but had also left traditional governance structures 
intact61. In this oral society, there was scope for considerable participation62, and the inter-clan meetings, 
financed by businesspeople and community leaders, lasted for weeks or months. UN support for the peace 
negotiation was rejected by the elders, as “peace-building was a process owned by people, not a UN project” 
(KI Senior government official). The elders thought that donors would hijack the agenda, “so the peace was 
created under the trees. If someone did not agree, his wife made him, because the peace is ours” (KI Senior 
government official).  
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The third 1993 Borama conference, attended by around five hundred elders and leaders, lasted for four months, 
and established a National Charter that defined the structures of Somaliland’s modern government63. The peace 
committees asked every chief to “talk to his young guerrillas and tell them to bring their guns. Then they put 
them in the military and police force and conscripted them” (KI, Market trader). The hybrid system of 
governance continues to combine traditional and democratic institutions, with the House of Elders or Guurthi 
as the upper house, and House of Representatives elected, but with seats in both houses proportionately 
allocated to the clans. Further outbreaks of fighting in 1995-1996 were resolved through negotiation and led 
to the Hargeisa Conference of 199764. Commentators have argued that SNM’s military supremacy in northern 
Somalia left few viable power structures65, and that the ‘imagined community’ of peace proved the moral basis 
for emergent government and citizen participation66.  
 
c. Humanitarian assistance in Somaliland 
 
In this section we discuss how the absence of humanitarian assistance and financial aid in Somaliland seems 
to have helped in establishing peace. Although several international agencies and NGOs had operated in 
Somalia during the 1980s, including UNICEF, UNDP, OCHA, and UNOPS67, all UN agencies and most NGOs 
withdrew during the fighting, with only a few, including ICRC68, Save the Children, and Médicins Sans 
Frontièrs, remaining in the country. In 1991-2, drought struck again, leading to famine, which killed around 
400,000 people, and belated media coverage spurred international action69.  
 
In April 1992, UNOSOM70 was established under UN Resolution 75171 to monitor a ceasefire and escort 
humanitarian aid into Mogadishu but the mission’s mandate did not include Somaliland. Largely supported by 
the United States, the operation was ill-fated. In 1992, the US established Operation Restore Hope to help the 
UN mission with famine relief, but in 1993 an attack by a Somali warlord on US forces brought down two US 
helicopters, resulting in the death of 18 US soldiers. Unfavourable public opinion forced withdrawal of US 
forces in 1994 and the UN mission closed in 199572. In Somaliland, the only effective external intervention 
was the restoration of the Hargeisa water supply by Oxfam and UNICEF, now being extended through a joint 
UN task-force.  
 
This absence of humanitarian assistance in Somaliland enabled the successful clan-led peace process to 
emerge. As described above, the inter-clan meetings lasted weeks and sometimes months, with the process 
owned by Somalilanders with no external influence from aid and development agencies. Our interviewees 
believed strongly that UN involvement would have resulted in unrealistic deadlines and the failure to achieve 
lasting peace.  
 
Lack of foreign finance also appears to have helped Somaliland in establishing peace73. Without international 
recognition, Somaliland has been unable to receive official development assistance – but as a result, is unable 
to get into debt. A 2009 report suggested the Somaliland received about US$180m a year in export earnings, 
US$200m in remittances, and US$79m in aid delivered only to NGOs or other non-government organisations; 
in Somaliland’s predominantly pastoral economy, dependence on local taxation and revenue-bargaining 
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ensured the development of inclusive and accountable government74. The diaspora community also exerted 
considerable pressure to maintain peace and protect business opportunities75. Without the support of the private 
sector, including revenues from the sale of the narcotic leaf, qat, formation of the Somaliland state would have 
been difficult. Chewing qat contributes to inform social practices that are important to social cohesion, despite 
the significant negative impacts of addiction76. 
 
V. THE INFORMAL ECONOMY IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED SOMALILAND 
In this empirical section we explore how the devastating conflict in Somaliland disrupted livelihoods but also 
how the seeds of recovery emerged. The collapse of the controlled economy of former Somalia created a void 
rapidly filled by private sector enterprise. Drawing on themes identified in the literature we document how the 
informal economy, through a process of community solidarity and trust, delivered replacement services, 
transformed gender norms, and accommodated war economies. These changes sowed the seeds for lasting 
economic transformation in the post-conflict phase. 
 
There is no doubt that the conflict in Somaliland, particularly the bombing of Hargeisa in 1988, utterly 
disrupted the Somaliland economy. Nearly all interviewees who had been working in the informal economy 
during the conflict reported that their businesses had been destroyed, and offered three main explanations. 
First, people fled the city, which resulted in the abandonment of businesses and the loss of a customer base. 
Second, the lack of security led to looting of goods and the invasion of business spaces, and third, infrastructure 
(particularly road infrastructure) was severely damaged, which made goods hard to acquire.  
 
“I lost all my customers at the beginning of the war, because all the people left…It caused me to go 
bankrupt and I lost all my business”. (Vegetable seller) 
 
“Everything was destroyed…During the conflict revolutionary soldiers looted everything; goods 
from businesses, pipes, electric cables…Transport was a problem as all the roads were mined, there 
were no taxis”. (KI, Market trader) 
 
Through a mixture of community sharing and private informal economy enterprises, replacement services 
emerged during or immediately after the conflict, mainly in the food, water, electricity and transport sectors. 
For example, a group of young people gathered together to repair damaged roads, clean streets and collect 
garbage in the absence of functioning local government services. Notably, some of the young people who were 
former fighters for the SNM were encouraged to lay down arms and “support their community in a different 
way” (NGO, Focus group). They went on to form Havoyoco, one of Somaliland’s oldest NGOs, which is now 
running a waste collection company under contract to the municipal government. In many ways these findings 
echo those of Hoffman77 in Liberia, where social networks of unemployed ex-combatants and other youths 
proved to be key to finding job opportunities and providing an alternative to fighting. In Somaliland, informal 
employment also replaced absent services.  
 
Whilst the informal economy clearly provided essential goods and services, it also played a disruptive and 
counter-productive role. Scholars have discussed the emergence of ‘war economies’, which include the sale of 
arms and opportunistic looting78. Such informal economies emerged in Hargeisa, with looting a widespread 
activity, albeit often attributed to ‘outsiders’ by our interviewees. Some of our interviews described how the 
lack of employment during the war spurred people to fight during the conflict.  
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“Before the conflict I was a truck driver and I was travelling to Djibouti bringing home goods. 
During the conflict I couldn’t do this and I became a warrior against the Somali government”. 
(Truck driver) 
 
Community solidarity was also evident in the widespread trust which played out during the conflict. Perhaps 
the most notable was the franco valuta money transfer system, in which large sums of money were moved 
informally across international borders. To avoid suspicion in importing cash, money would be given to an 
individual, for example in Djibouti, who would purchase goods and import these into Somaliland, paying the 
transfer recipient through the proceeds – all on the basis of trust. When asked how this trust had developed, 
one market worker explained:  
 
“Trust develops in so many ways – a father’s relative, a mother’s relative, someone from the same 
district, a cousin, by marriage, their past, their neighbourhood, from the same city, a shared 
history. It’s something that you earn. They don’t cheat each other”. (KI, Market trader) 
 
Sharing was important in meeting the needs for basic services, as one interviewee explained; 
 
“Yes there were some replacement services like using generators and small camps used gasoline; 
donkeys and camels were shared for transport”. (Informal economy worker) 
 
It is well established that conflict can transform gender roles79, a trend that was prominent in Hargeisa’s 
conflict-affected economy. Interviewees explained that before the conflict, women rarely worked and men 
were considered to be the ‘breadwinners’, but this changed during the war. Women began to play a significant 
economic role during the early 1980s when many men migrated, often to the Arab states, or left to join the 
fight with the SNM. Women generally adopted low-skilled roles in petty trade, “selling food, selling qat, 
operating small kiosks and selling clothing” (Women’s focus group), which perhaps explains the persistent 
vulnerabilities discussed below. Other research has found that women’s economic empowerment is 
strengthened where women have learnt new income-earning skills80, which perhaps positions them better in 
the post-conflict labour market. Later, particularly during the bombings of 1988, the many women who fled 
Hargeisa to refugee camps in Ethiopia started small businesses, such as trading with nomads. 
 
“I walked to Ethiopia during the crisis and lived in a refugee camp. There we had to collect water 
and wood. Somaliland men were the fighters. In the camps we had to start some sort of business. 
Some could travel and brought dried meat and ghee from Djibouti, then they brought hard 
currency into Somaliland….Women were the breadwinners”. (KI, Senior government official)
  
“Before the war there was not that much involvement [from women in the informal economy]. It 
started in the refugee camps when women started to manage the rations. They used the refugee 
portions to make money – they improved the taste and sold to the nomads. The nomads also 
became dependent on refugee handouts”. (KI, NGO leader) 
 
Women also played key leadership roles during the conflict and recovery. Key informants described how 
women worked effectively to bring fighting youth of the SNM back into work, helping them find jobs in the 
informal economy: 
 
“We first worked with former militants (fighters). We told them to cut their hair, clean their nails 
and we would help them look for a job. They found jobs as security guards and they also engaged 
in literacy classes”. (KI, NGO leader) 
 
Furthermore, the disruption to social norms and collapse of the controlled economy of former Somalia created 
a void rapidly filled by private sector enterprise. The new structures that emerged through conflict formed the 
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basis for lasting change from which the dominant private-sector of modern Somaliland emerged, including a 
heavy reliance on the diaspora community. 
 
“In 1991 when we revoked the union with Somalia, the private sector became very strong. Until 
this day it has not collapsed, and there is no intention of government to reverse that”. (KI, 
Senior government official) 
 
“When they moved back to the cities, they had very few resources. The majority became involved 
in the informal sector. For the rest, the diaspora contributed”. (KI, NGO leader) 
 
In analysing the role of the informal economy to inform aid support and economic recovery, four core factors 
emerged as important. First, local informal enterprises emerged, providing livelihoods and meeting the need 
for food and basic services. Second, was the importance of a trust-based economy facilitating imports and 
exports and that was essential in a context where no banking system existed. Third, was the changing and more 
prominent social and economic role of women. Fourth, was the importance of private sector enterprise, 
including the diaspora community, in funding the recovery.  
 
VI. THE LASTING IMPACTS OF SELF-HELP ENTERPRISE 
 
Whilst Somaliland is yet to be recognized as an independent state, its self-help recovery has underpinned the 
evolution of a functioning but fragile government, and the private sector (which remains largely informal) has 
provided the drive, funding and moral contract to underpin the emerging state. This second empirical section 
explores the lasting impacts of Somaliland’s self-help economic recovery. 
 
a. Political and economic change 
 
Politically, Somaliland’s achievements in building a hard-won peace that has been maintained for two decades, 
and democratic governance grounded in respect for human rights, are both “improbable and deeply 
impressive”81. In contrast to the bloodshed and famine in Somalia, the democratic transition in Somaliland has 
been remarkable. A constitutional referendum was held in 2001, followed by credible national presidential 
elections in 2003, a parliamentary vote in 2005 that put the opposition in power, and further presidential 
elections in 2010, again a change of party82, although the next round of elections were delayed. The police 
corps, judicial institutions and courts are under-resourced but well established, and there is a vibrant print 
media, although human rights challenges remain83.  
 
Yet despite the political progress, the development challenges remain acute. Although there is no census, the 
population is thought to be around 4.0-4.5 million, with 50-60% living in urban areas, 25–35% nomadic, and 
2-3% IDPs84 85. The latest figures for GDP per capita estimated in 2012 were US$347, the fourth lowest in the 
world. Poverty in urban areas is estimated at 29%, and only half of children aged 6-13 go to school86. 
Nevertheless, the government remains independent of external capital and up to 2013 had operated a surplus 
in all but 2008 and 2011, when the deficit was covered by private sector borrowing87.  
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Economically, the private sector and diaspora are key in providing both the political support for peace and 
funds for state-building88. The informal economy continues to be a key source of livelihoods and its potential 
for growth is unofficially understood – as government officials noted: 
 
“From a government point of view, the private sector is more dynamic than government-led 
initiatives. People you see selling bananas (street vendors) are part of that private sector. 
Speaking about potentiality we have to include these small ones – until now the government has 
been looking at the big guys, but even now the big guys are not contributing [tax]”. (KI, Senior 
government official) 
 
“The government is not helping but it’s not hindering. It gives the informal sector space to develop 
and grow. It’s perfect capitalism – minimum government interference; minimum government 
taxes (corporation tax is only 10%; VAT is 5% but they are not collected effectively)”. (KI, Senior 
government official) 
 
A laissez faire approach from government and lack of restrictive regulation has helped growth. There is also 
potential for accumulation – as one interviewee said, “One of the biggest fuel sellers started selling a tin of 
fuel. Now he is a millionaire” – but this is rare. Almost half of the current informal economy workers 
interviewed worked alone, and people lack business skills.  
 
“Small SME enterprises do not have the skills in marketing… They will open a shop, and get 
benefits for a short period of time, but they don’t have the capacity to break the frontiers. We need 
a paradigm shift to strengthen the whole private sector”. (KI, Senior government official) 
 
“As long as they can provide food and send their children to school it’s enough for them, but they 
need to grow. The big question for Somaliland is how long will we remain like this? Where are 
the opportunities to grow?” (KI, NGO worker). 
 
Thus the civil war and peace negotiations created a political and economic context in which informal economy 
workers could survive, but it remains unclear whether political pluralism and a more supportive policy context 
will continue, enabling both an increase in productivity and tax revenue from informal economy operations. 
Thus workers themselves remain in an uncertain and in-between state of benign tolerance.  
 
b. Lasting solidarity impacts 
 
In many ways the community solidarity in Somaliland evident during the conflict has persisted. Although 
community solidarity may also have existed before the civil war, our research identified its particular 
importance and its nature both during conflict and today. Trust that existed during conflict now permeates 
economic transactions, and remains critical to continued stability. It is notable that informal currency 
exchanges operate in the street, with piles of cash tied up in net bags. 
 
“All the informal owners show their interest to keep peace, so there is trust. If we see anyone 
attempting to threaten, we will tell them to stop and that we will punish them – it’s called 
‘aminaat’. We hand them over to the courts. To us a receipt is unusual, what is important is 
‘danwidag’ meaning ‘sharing the same interest’. There are 300 businesses in the market. People 
are taking $14,000, $15,000 up to $80,000 a day. However not a single item goes missing”. (KI, 
Market trader) 
 
Another aspect of trust is the relative safety at work in Hargeisa. Hargeisa stands out in comparison to many 
other low-income countries, as there is limited harassment of street vendors and informal workers. In most 
other sub-Saharan cities these workers are highly vulnerable to police harassment, evictions, confiscations and 
fines. Out of the 168 current informal economy workers interviewed, only 7% had experienced any sort of 
harassment or had been fined by the city government. Furthermore, when asked about laloush (small scale 
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bribes), only 5% had ever paid bribes to local officials or others. Remarkably, 92% of respondents, most of 
whom were working on the street, felt that women were safe or very safe in their business environment. 
 
However, community solidarity has been undermined by conflict economies. One particularly problematic 
sector is the narcotic leaf, qat. The lack of regulation of qat during the conflict enabled large-scale import, as 
the best quality comes from Kenya and Ethiopia89. The qat industry is a major employer, particularly of 
women. However, qat has been condemned for lowering human productivity, draining household income and 
increasing domestic abuse90. Key informants reported the effect of qat on family relationships and household 
income.  
 
“A man wakes up at 11:00am, eats lunch, gets high and begins fighting with his family, leading 
to domestic violence. Women are overburdened, we look after the babies, we are a wife and 
mother, a breadwinner, and [also] serve our communities”. (KI, NGO Worker) 
 
There is no restriction on qat imports and it is relatively lightly taxed, resulting in millions of dollars leaving 
Somaliland.  
 
“There is a huge flight of hard currency to Ethiopia - US$420m a year and only US $21m is 
received in tax revenue. Qat affects labour productivity and mental health. However there are 
about 20,000 people employed in qat, mostly women, and we cannot simply stop it. The pattern 
of consumption needs to be changed, for example, qat could be sold for a shorter period. We need 
to change the tax, raise awareness of its effects and create alternative employment for sellers”. 
(KI, Senior government official) 
 
Another sector that increased after the conflict was the charcoal industry. This has not affected solidarity, but 
is problematic for the environment. Women commonly trade in firewood and charcoal, but the charcoal 
industry also overexploits the scrub woodland around Hargeisa and there are major concerns about 
deforestation in the sparse semi-arid environment. 
 
c. Lasting gender impacts 
 
Women’s economic roles have been transformed since the conflict. Researchers elsewhere have found that 
women’s entry into the workforce tends to be sustained in the post-conflict period, and can lead to their 
economic empowerment91. This has certainly been evident in Hargeisa.  
   
“There are more women in the informal economy than men. Somaliland women can make their 
own decisions. They can travel, own property, even though we are a conservative Muslim nation. 
Women are becoming big business owners now; the main hotel in Burao is owned by a woman. 
Some women are involved in clothes imports from China, medicine, furniture”. (KI: NGO 
Worker) 
 
However, women working in the informal economy continue to be more vulnerable than their male 
counterparts. The interviews with 168 current informal economy workers suggest that women tend to be older 
and have fewer years of schooling – 55% of women interviewed were aged 36 years or over, compared to only 
22% of men, while 41% of women had no primary education, compared to 25% of men. Women also tend to 
earn less, with 35% of women interviewed earning less than 10 Shillings a day compared to 13% of men. 
Illiteracy is thus a continuing problem in business development. 
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“Women don’t have capital or skills. When starting a business they don’t do a needs assessment. 
When they travel abroad to buy they don’t include the cost of travel/hotels etc.” (KI, NGO worker) 
 
“We don’t have the skills to set up an association, the government should assist us”. (Informal 
economy worker) 
 
Although women’s economic empowerment has increased since the civil war, the reversal in traditional gender 
roles has caused social tension.  
 
“Since the civil war women have changed their traditional role, because women normally feed 
the family... In many towns, women are the breadwinners and manage the resources… 
Psychologically this undermines men, the socio-economic norm is reversing”. (KI, NGO worker) 
 
“[If the husband is not working] the kids need food. Women have to go out, it’s not a matter of 
choice. But the husband is used to being given food and qat and becoming happy to be 
unemployed, he may even take another wife”. (KI, Female informal economy, clothing) 
 
Furthermore, while women played a political and leadership role after conflict, they face barriers in 
participation in political decision-making. The clan structure dominated by male elders does not allow for 
equal representation for women, and a new ruling on female quotas in parliament has not yet been 
implemented.  
 
VII. CONCLUSION  
 
Through a case study in Somaliland, this paper sought to explore what happens when, in the context of 
devastating civil war, humanitarian response is absent.  Examining ‘self-help’ economic recovery can inform 
humanitarian support for urban livelihoods in the aftermath of conflict. Where they exist, the livelihood 
programmes of humanitarian aid agencies are still in their infancy, with many focused only on rural 
livelihoods. There is a lack of research and expertise about urban livelihoods in conflict situations. Just as 
Turner’s work on self-help housing in Peru in the 1960s and 1970s informed aided self-help approaches in the 
housing development sector, so this research on self-help informal enterprise will ideally inform humanitarian 
support for urban livelihoods in the aftermath of conflict. 
 
Many positive developments emerged through self-help informal enterprises in Somaliland. First, diaspora 
communities played a critical role in providing both the political support for peace and funds for state-building. 
Second, small-scale informal economies provided and continue to provide a key source of livelihoods, and 
replaced disrupted services such as food, water, electricity and transport provision. Third, we documented 
evidence of the role of community solidarity and trust, which has persisted. Finally, as seen in conflicts 
elsewhere, gender norms were disrupted, with women stepping in to fill key economic roles and playing an 
important part in peace negotiations. 
 
There are clear lessons here for the humanitarian aid community in ensuring that such positive developments 
are enabled through livelihood interventions. As Régnier, UNDP, ILO-World Bank studies have pointed out, 
there is an increasing focus on livelihoods in recovery, but the urban informal economy’s response through 
crisis is not widely understood. Essentially, aid actors must provide an environment which encourages self-
help solutions, avoiding potentially paternalistic responses that could hinder community action and do harm 
to community potential. There are also opportunities to ‘build back better’ – supporting the beneficial impacts 
of self-help approaches. For example, the informal economy has potential for growth, so aid and development 
actors might guide government and civil society on the creation of an enabling environment for informal 
enterprises, which would include steps such as licensing, securing work spaces, access to key infrastructure 
such as water and electricity, access to training and micro-finance. The approach could include targeted actions 
to address the vulnerabilities of women and other disadvantaged groups in the informal economy.  
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Conflict economies emerged in Somaliland, just as they did in countries where aid actors were present, and 
these economies undermined some of the social and economic successes of the self-help responses in 
Somaliland. One particularly problematic sector which has persisted and grown is the market in the narcotic 
leaf, qat. The challenge for the humanitarian sector is how to intervene in such conflict economies without 
doing harm to the positive impacts of self-help informal enterprises.  
 
Finally, the Somaliland case study highlights a further important lesson. Despite the lack of a functioning 
government in the newly declared secessionist state, community leadership was dispersed and highly effective 
in negotiating peace, but worked over a much longer time-frame than international agencies normally consider. 
Leaders rejected aid in the peace negotiations, as they wanted peace through consensus rather than an 
externally imposed negotiation. Community solidarity over a long period has also been important in economic 
recovery. For self-help approaches to work effectively, aid and development agencies must align their funding 
and programming with these local contexts.  
 
We argue that – as in the case of Peruvian self-help housing in the 1960s and 1970s informing new directions 
in housing policy - the learning from self-help informal enterprises in Somaliland should inform the practices 
of humanitarian aid, in order to improve the livelihoods and recovery process of many of the poorest urban 
residents in conflict-affected locations. 
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